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G8 Summits and Compliance
ELLA KOKOTSIS AND JOSEPH P. DANIELS

People and politicians are dominated by quite excessive expectations as to what can possibly, or practically, be delivered by governmental economic policies.
- T.W. Hutchison, Knowledge and Ignorance in Economics

Introduction
Since 1975, the leaders of the major industrial democracies have met at the
annual Group ofSeven and Group ofEight (G7/G8) summits to address the
most pressing international issues of the day, deliberate on shared problems
and collectively set directions for the global community. The summits have
often produced ambitious and wide-ranging agreements in an effort to generate a multilateral consensus on a diverse number of shared economic and
politicar issues.
Des pite the attention given the G7/G8 summit process and the new
interest by international relations theorists in the issue of compliance with
international agreements (Jacobson and Weiss, 1995; Chayes and Chayes,
1994) there has been little effort to analyze and explain compliance with,
and explore the credibility of, summit policy commitments, and to do so as
a foundation for identifying proposals to improve the summit process.
Although there exists a wealth of scholarly and professional writing on the
G8, virtually all of it focuses on the first order question of reaching agreements through effective policy coordination. Thus, little has been produced
on the soundness of these commitments and the extent to which summit
members comply with them.
Do the G8 summits make a difference? Is the summit process credible and worthy of the enormous media attention it receives? Studies of
summit compliance and credibility indicate that the summits do accomplish
something, but perhaps not as much as one would like them to. Further,
there are significant differences in the compliance record across countries
and issue areas. Reforms suggested here, which would curtail the pomp and
circumstance, streamline the summit format, and narrow the issues dis75
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cussed to those that meet core criteria for effectiveness, should generate
fewer, yet higher quality commitments, which are more likely to be fulfilled.
This chapter details the findings of separate data sets on G7 summit
compliance based on studies by George von Furstenberg and Joseph
Daniels, Ella Kokotsis, and Ella Kokotsis and John J. Kirton, as well as
findings on the soundness of these commitments by Joseph Daniels. It then
examines explanations of summit compliance and presents conclusions
about why compliance is higher in certain issue areas than in others. It finally offers practica} proposals and policy options for the G8 partners to reform
the summit process in order to generate higher quality policy commitments
that are more likely to be fulfilled.

Gauging Compliance with and the Credibility of Policy Commitments
For past summits to be considered productive and meaningful, and the
process viewed as credible, the policy commitments endorsed by the leaders
and made public though the summit declaration should m~et three criteria.
First, they should be ambitious. Second, they should be complied with.
Thirdly, the links between means and ends should be based on sound reasoning. Existing evidence is used to examine ifthe policy promises made at
the summits meet these criteria. Doing so casts light on the various conjectures and theories of effective multilateral policymaking. In this manner, the
quantitative record of the summits is employed to identify past success and
provide insights on how to improve the summit process itself.
Before summarizing various findings about the record of compliance, it is useful to consider the general methodological approach that makes
summary scores meaningful. Von Furstenberg and Daniels (1991, 1992)
were the first to quantify commitments made at the su mm its and gauge the
extent to which these commitments have been fulfilled. This work, which
centers on the economic communique only, establishes a uniform approach
for gauging compliance.

Methodological Approach to Compliance Measurement

1

1

Arguably, the economic communiqué issued at the conclusion of each summit represents a quasi-legal contract, as the leaders endorse the commitments contained therein. This document is used as the sole data source for
the von Furstenberg and Daniels methodology, which ignores statements or
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press releases that may proceed or follow the release of the communiqué.
Peter Hajnal's study, The Seven Power Summit: Documents .from the
Summits of Industrialized Countries, 1975-1989, contains the official economic communique of these early summits and is the source document of
these studies (Hajnal, 1989).
There are two general types of commitments that are embedded in
the communiqué. The first type is a policy measure, which is a commitment
to deliver a specific legislative package, such as a balanced budget agreement. The second type of commitment is a policy outcome, which is a shift
in an ecopomic variable, such as reducing the deficit, or reducing inflation.
Only those commitments that are concrete enough to identify and quantify
the intended policy measure or policy outcome are considered.
The next step in monitoring compliance is to establish a scoring
metric that assigns a number reflecting the degree to which a commitment
was fu lfilled. The classic approach is to define a range of scores from -1 to
1, where a score of 1 reflects complete fulfillment. A score of -1 is assigned
if the actual outcome was the opposite of that committed to. Focusing primarily on policy outcomes, von Furstenberg and Daniels use the entire ínterval between -1 and 1 to as.sign scores. This methodology enables the identification and quantification of the commitments and assesses in a uniform
manner the degree to which they were fulfilled. The scores can then be used
to examine various hypothesis regarding the summit process.

Summary of Findings on Compliance
Using the methodology described above, von Furstenberg and Daniels
(1992) derive an overall average score for the 209 commitments revealed in
the communiqués ofthe first fifteen summits. The average score was 0.317,
or 32 percent, meaning that, roughly one-third of what was promised was
actually delivered by the policymakers. These results suggest that G7 members do comply, albeit weakly, with their summit commitments. Moreover,
compliance scores vary widely by country, with high compliance coming
from Canada and Britain and low compliance from the United States and
France. Compliance also varíes widely by issue area, with intemational
trade and energy receiving high compliance scores and interest and
exchange rate management receiving low scores.
Subsequent research by von Furstenberg and Daniels (1993) combines macroeconomic forecasts generated by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) with the policy commitments made
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at the annual summits. Since these forecasts are generated so near the time
of the summits, it is reasonable to assume that the forecasts and summit
commitments are independent of each other. The forecasts, therefore, can
be used to determine the degree of ambition of summit commitments.
Using the 209 commitments of the first study, the authors are able
to generate sample statistics to test the joint-null hypothesis of "no summit
ambition" and "no summit effect". Again, though the overall seo re is low,
the authors are able to reject, in a statistical sense, the null hypothesis. That
is, the commitments are ambitious and there was low, but positive compliance (see Table 5.1 ). This conclusion stands in stark contrast to the opinion
of one sherpa at the 1997 Denver summit, who claimed that the "summits
Table 5.1 Average (a), Standard Deviation (SD) and Number of
Scores (N) for 1975-89 Economic Summit Undertakings
Seo re
All Undertakings
- with 6A replacing 6.

Average

SD

N

(N-1)"'"'

0.307
0.355

0.684
0.649

203
135

0.070
0.086

------- - ------- - ---- -- -- - ---~:-~Y. ~!.>-~1_1~9:•. Q!..~~-~~~_!-~ ~-~~!"&~~!~-~Y.-~!~~-~-~ _1_?~-~ -~~!'. --------------------------- United States
Japan
Gennany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
All Single-Country
All Multi-Country

0.246
0.262
0.346
0.240
0.413
0.274
0.409
0.306
0.314

0 .730
0.632
0.740
0.612
0.743
0.688
0.603
0.685
0.687

33
28
23
23
21
26
24
178
25

0.177
0.192
0.213
0.213
0.224
0.200
0.209
0.075
0.204

__________________ _____________________ ~·-- º~!~!! _~Y. X~! !!.~!~l!!i.!l.':'~ -<;_l!l_l_t_~l!!~l!~.i!!!Y. ___ _______ _________ ______________ __ ___ _
l. Real GNP Growth
2. Demand Composition
3. Intemational Trade
4. Fiscal Adjustments
5. Interest Rate
6. InflationRate
6A. Multi-Country Scoring
7. Foreign Exchange Rate
8. Aid and Schedules
9. Energy

0.397
0.233
0.734
0.259
0.221
0.221
0.266
-0.700
0.265
0.660

0.623
0.801
0.364
0.680
0.526
0.731
0.672
0.301
0.388
0.559

17
7
7
40
20
80
12
2
25

0.250
0.408
0.408
0.160
0.229
0.113
0.302
1
0.5
0.204

Direct Policy Measures
All Others

0.279
0.309

0.617
0.688

10
193

0.333
0.072

All Except Energy
All Except lnflation

0.258
0.364

0.686
0.646

178
123

0.075
0.091

5

TI1is is the standard deviation (SD) of the average score under the joint null hypothesis that the population value of the
SD of scores is 1 because Summit ambition and effect are both O.

'1
1

1~

!1

11

1

Source: Scores for 1975-80 Summits calculated by George von Furstenberg and Joseph P. Daniels
in "Policy Undertakings by the Seven Summit Countries: Ascertaining the Degree ofCompliance".
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 35 (Autumn 1991), 267-308
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tend to under-promise and over-deliver".
Subsequent compliance studies, conducted by Kokotsis (1998), and
Kokotsis and Kirton (1997), analyze the G7's compliance record from 19881995 in regard to the G7's environment and development commitments,
which flourished during this period. These studies explore the compliance
record of the G8's most and least powerful members, the United States and
Canada, in an effort to examine the effects on compliance of overall relative
capability and to explore the way differences in national institutions affect
compliancct outcomes.
Four issue areas critica! to the global environment and development
agenda - climate change, biodiversity, developing country debt and assistance to Russia - are considered. The period from 1988-1995 provides an
era of sustained summit attention to, and important action on these issues. It
is a period during which summit attention and ambition has varied, and one
where lags in compliance are visible. This combination of eight years, two
countries, and four issue areas, including 83 specific commitments, offers
enough cases to identify compliance patterns and isolate key compliance
variables (see Figure 5.1).

Figure 5.1 A Comparison of U.S. vs. Canadian Compliance with G7
Commitments, 1988-95

..

20

-10

1988

1989

1990

W Tot. i# of Commttments
• Cdn . Net Leve! of Compliance
• US Net Leve! of Compliance

17

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

SummitYear

Source: Compiled by E. Kokotsis

These findings suggest that during its third summit cycle, the G7
produced a large number of specific and often ambitious environment and
development commitments - 34 regarding climate change, 15 regarding
biodiversity, 13 regarding developing country debt, and 21 regarding
assistañce to Russia. Canadian and U.S. compliance with these commitments
has generally been positive, with an overall score of 43%. Yet wide variations appear by country, issue area, and over time: Canada's net score of
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53o/o contrasts with the U.S. net score of 34o/o. Compliance is much higher
in regard to assistance to Russia and developing country debt, than for climate change and above all biodiversity.
These findings suggest severa} trends. First, during its third sevenyear cycle, the G7 offered a larger number of specific and often ambitious
environment and development commitments than was the overall norm for
the earlier period. These findings thus suggest that the summit has become
more active in generating specific, identifiable, and measurable agreements
in these key areas.
Second, wide variations arise by country, from Canada's 53o/o to the
U.S.'s 34%. This outcome is consistent with that found by von Furstenberg
and Daniels ( 41 o/o for Canada and 25% for the U.S.). As the methodology
of Kokotsis, and Kokotsis and Kirton differs slightly from that of von
Furstenberg and Daniels, as the former employ a discrete scale, using only
the values of -1, O and 1, while the latter use all possible values between -1
and 1, direct or absolute comparisons cannot be made. Hence, no definitive
conclusions can be reached regarding rising or falling compliance scores
between the periods considered, or for a widening or narrowing of compliance gaps between nations.
Third, there continues to be wide variation across issue areas .
During the third summit cycle, compliance is much higher in regard to assistance for Russia (81 %) and developing country debt (73%), than for climate
change (34%) and, particularly, biodiversity (-13%).
Finally, there is significant variation over time within the third cycle
of summitry for G7 environment commitments. Compliance is lower for
both Canada and the U.S. in the pre-Rio period of 1988-1991 than in the
post-Rio period of 1992-1995. There is a notable peak period of high compliance, which both Canada and the US share, centred around the Rio year
of 1992.
Means-Ends Relationships and Credibility of Commitments
Just as the declarations make public the policy promises, they also provide
glimpses of what the actions promised are aimed at helping accomplish. In
this way, sorne of the general economic relationships and specific links
between means and ends the policymakers subscribe to have come to light,
revealing occasional disagreements, shifts of emphasis or evolution ofviewpoints over time.
In theory, disagreement among policymakers on the "correct" struc-
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ture of the economy, and therefore the appropriate policy responses, can
presenta formidable obstacle to economic policy coordination. It is doubtful that such disagreements are very inhibiting to the policy process, as policymakers are exposed to various models of domestic agencies as well as the
models of their foreign counterparts. Thus, a consensus view is developed
that incorporates the various modeling ideologies, forecasts, track records,
and judgments, all of which are held with varying degrees of conviction.
Multiplier and policy lag uncertainty, on the other hand, may indeed inhibit
the coordination process. In essence, the viability of economic theory that
policymakers subscribe to becomes a "technological constraint" on establishing policymaking credibility (Blackburn and Christensen, 1989).
Daniels (1993) represents the lone comprehensive empirical evaluation ofthe means-ends relationships advanced at the economic summits. In
this study, the various relationships that were revealed in the declarations of
the first fifteen summits were inventoried and evaluated in light of recent
empirical evidence found in the literature or provided by the author. Based
on this evidence, the relationships were judged as either "wel1-advised",
"arguable", or "ill-advised". Further, the relationships were classified as
Keynesian , new classical , or other, to determine ifthere was any progression
of economic thinking revealed in the declaration.
Eighteen distinct economic relationships were gleaned from the
declarations of the first fifteen summits. The classification of relationships
displayed no significant pattem or shift in economic thinking over time. lt
does, however, show that understandings that relate to national aggregates
imply a traditional Keynesian view, while understandings that rest on externallinkages are consistent with a Mundell-Fiemming model for interna! and
externa! balances.
One might suspect that policymakers would play it safe and promote publicly only those actions whose motivation is above chal1enge, thus
reinforcing the credibility oftheir policy announcements. By comparing the
relationships advanced in the declaration with the empirical evidence, this
does not appear to be the case. Seven of the eighteen relationships were
considered to be "well advised". Ten, however, were considered to be
"arguable". Hence, the effectiveness of many of the policy actions
announced at the summits may be compromised by the uncertainty of economic theory and models' forecasts that policymakers subscribe to.
To summarize, the G7/8 summits have delivered a large number of
policy commitments on economic, environmental, and development issues.
The extent to which these commitments were fulfilled is positive, though, in
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the case of economic commitments, disappointingly low. Further, promises
were ambitious, rejecting the notion that policy makers "do not go out on a
limb" at the summits. Additionally, the means-ends relationships that policy commitments rest upon are suspect and possibly compromise the effectiveness of the policy actions even if they were fully complied with. Thus,
the summits are indeed worth something, but leave much room for improvement in the process they currently follow.

Explanations of Summit Compliance
Given that summit declarations are not legally binding documents, that no
formal enforcement mechanism exists to ensure that implementation systematically occurs, that domestic circumstances and leadership change from
year to year, and that sorne commitments are superseded by subsequent
agreements, one might expect the compliance with G8 summit commitments would be very low. The studies outlined above conclude, however,
that over time, the summit has, in general, been active in generating agreements that are specific, identifiable and measurable, that compliance with
Summit commitments has been positive and sustained, and that positive
compliance appears across countries. How does one account for and explain
these pattems of summit compliance?

Conjectures on Policy Coordination

1

!

1

The scores that resulted from the von Furstenberg and Daniels studies
described above were grouped by summit, country, function , and controllability (see Table 5.1). The authors use these aggregate scores to draw conclusions on sorne popular conjectures regarding international policy making.
The first conjecture is that joint economic commitments tend to be honored
to a lesser degree than an individual commitment, as collective commitments generate "free-rider" problems. The findings indicate no statistical
difference between these two types of commitments. Hence, compliance
with collective commitments was no less than with commitments assigned
to specific countries.
The second conjecture considered is that commitments that promise
delivery of a policy measure or instrument that is under the direct control of
policy makers would be honored to a higher degree than commitments
promising an outcome for a policy target (Putnam and Henning, 1989). The
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scores reveal the opposite. Commitments on direct policy measures receive
a lower than average score than those on economic targets. It appears that
policymakers have as much difficulty adopting policy measures as they do
forecasting the impact of policy measures on target variables.'
Finally, it is argued that policy makers of smaller nations would
scrupulously honour their commitments so as to provide political leverage
over the policy makers ofthe larger and more powerful nations. Further, the
degree to which one nation can visit macroeconomic extemalities upon
another depends on the relative size of the nations (Dobson, 1991). As a
result, large nations would be less likely to honor their commitments.
Though Britain and Canada received the highest compliance scores,
and the United States the second lowest, the scores do not reveal any systematic pattern based on economy size. Likewise, there is no significant
correlation of compliance scores with the relative size of the economy, as
measured by its GDP. Therefore, the evidence does not support either conjecture relating compliance to the size of the nation.
Institutional Variables and Regimes
Institutional variables and the role of regimes point to further explanations
of summit compliance. The findings on debt and assistance to Russia indicate that there has been a sustained, and in fact high level of summit compliance by both Canada and the US in these issue areas during the third summit cycle. This reflects important national institutional variables at work.
Within both of these issue areas, the implementation of summit resolutions
occurs through long-established departments (Treasury and Finance) possessing well-defined domestic implementation responsibilities, and manifesting strong institutional links to powerful multilateral organizations.
The existence of a well-defined and clearly established process
within Treasury and Finance for the domestic implementation of debt and
Russian-related commitments helps guarantee a systematic operationalization ofthe communiqué. Given that finance ministries have the most regularized communication through the G7 finance deputies process, compliance
is generally higher with issues stemming from finance ministries, followed
by those arising from foreign ministries. This view is confirmed by senior
government officials in both Ottawa and Washington who affirm that
"finance ministries have the most well-developed coordination of followthrough, with the foreign ministries next". 2 A senior Canadian government
official concurred with this correlation between the role of finance min-
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istries with respect to summit compliance:
On the economic side, it's easier because the institutional framework already exists. On the political side, there's no mechanism
for follow-up. Thus the G7 has been less successful in ensuring
follow-up on non-economic issues in the past. The G7 fmance
deputies process ensures sorne level of follow-up, more so than
within foreign ministries.3
By contrast, the Department of Environment in Canada and the
Environmental Protection Agency in the United States are examples of
departments/agencies possessing less of an established process to deal with
the implementation of summit commitments. This is primarily because
these agencies/departments have been in existence for a relatively shorter
period of time.They are bureaucratically less capable of dealing with the
domestic implementation of international commitments. Moreover, they
possess less money in overall budgetary terms and are thus less influential
than older, more established great departments of state or central agencies such as Finance or Treasury. As such, lower compliance comes with environment commitments than with those arising from departments of Finan ce
and Treasury.
National institutional variables further serve to account for Canada's
higher overall record of summit compliance compared to that of the U.S.
Within Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
(DFAIT), a permanent G8 summit coordination office, staffed with permanent officers, exists to manage, handle, oversee and execute summit undertakings beginning early on in the preparatory process and continuing
throughout the year. By contrast, a summit coordination office, or "line
office" dealing specifically with G8 undertakings, does not exist at the U.S.
State Department, Treasury, or the White House. Although directives are
sent out to ministries regarding summit undertakings, the thrust to move
these initiatives forward often wanes after the annual summit dueto the fact
that a central coordinating office does not exist in the US to execute surnmit
resolutions. According to a US government official, "There is no summit
coordination office, unlike in Canada, and the energy falls off dramatically
post-summit" .4
International institutional factors also affect summit compliance.
Departments of Finance and Treasury possess well-established institutional
links to long-existing international fora, including the París Club,
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. These are the institu-
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tions responsible for the implementation of Russian assistance and debtrelated issues. Because the G7 members are the major shareholders within
these institutions, they are able to set the agenda, prompt action and secure
agreements on the implementation of these issues. By contrast, domestic
environmental departments lack coordinating centres for G7 /8-related activity and oversight and rely for intemational implementation on the fragmented specialized agencies ofthe United Nations. Here the G7 countries do not
possess overwhelming controlling strength due to both institutional characteristics (the one-country-one-vote rule) and underlying issue-specific capabilities and contributions. An overall lower level of compliance is thus
assured, especially for commitments which require action by international
organizations for their implementation.
Furthermore, the G7 Finance Ministers and Finance Deputies fora,
which have existed since 1986, allows the G7 to reinforce the national-international institutional link and intensely monitor the implementation of
G7/G8 commitments. The G7 Finance Ministers and Finance Deputies
process is more institutionally entrenched than the newer, more "embryonic" and still-evolving G7 /G8 environment ministerial forum that emerged
only in 1992. Given that the environment ministerials appeared later in the
summit system, compliance is expected to be lower with environmental
commitments. What should further be noted is that the timing of such ministerials is also relevant to compliance. According to Nicholas Bayne:
Ministerials which follow fairly soon after the summit are the
most helpful in encouraging compliance. The timing of the IMF
meetings of finance ministers, three months later, is useful in this
regard. Pre-summit ministerials, like those of the environment
ministers, can help shape the summit agenda but may not help
compliance. 5

An additional intemational institutional variable of relevance is
apparent in the summit's environment agenda. The empirical findings reveal
that there is no net compliance during the period 1989-1991 in either climate
change or biodiversity. Beginn ing in 1992 and onwards, however, there is a
high leve] of sustained environmental compliance. This is primarily dueto
two factors. First, 1992 marked the launching of a new era in environmental diplomacy with the convening of the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
Convening just three weeks later in Munich for their annual summit meeting, the G7 leaders agreed on the importance of ratifying the climate change
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and biodiversity conventions, and stressed the need to implement the decisions embraced. Thus, as the Earth Summit quickly developed into a nested regime, a "Rio effect" is observed, corresponding with a higher level of
environmental compliance by Canada and the US with the agreements
reached atRio and endorsed at the G7 Summit. 6
The 1991/92 "Rio rise" was also coincident with the institutionalization of the G7 environment ministerials, beginning in Germany just prior
to the 1992 Munich Summit, and then continuing in Florence, Italy in 1994,
Hamilton, Canada in 1995, Cabourg, France in 1996, Miami, Florida in
1997, and Leeds Castle, England in 1998. These G7/G8 environment ministerials have proceeded to endorse the Rio conventions and have emphasized the importance oftheir continued implementation.
Finally, there is a third institutional variable of relevan ce. It relates
to the expansion of both the preparatory and follow-up phases of the summit. This expansion has led sorne officials to conclude that the summit
process itself has become more institutionalized over the last summit cycle.
In turn, this has precipitated an overall rise in compliance by both Canada
and the US during the summit's third cycle as compared to the previous two.
According to a Canadian official:
There was an inherent reluctance to institutionalize the process,
although 1 think it's fair to say that over time, there became more
frequent meetings after each Summit, and the meetings to prepare
for the next Summit began earlier than before. So it became
almost a full-time job and certainly became an annual exercise as
opposed to a summer event - not only in the preparatory phases,
but also in the stock-taking ofwhat had been achieved. 7

Political Control by G7 Heads of State and Government
In addition to institutions and regimes, the element of political control helps
explain compliance with summit commitments. The fact that leaders themselves are present at the summit table seems to ensure that the decisions they
reach, and the commitments they make, carry added weight. There are no
higher-level bureaucrats at home to whom their decisions are deferred. As
a result, when the leaders become personally associated with a summit commitment, it is somewhat different than if that commitment had been produced by a group of ministers. As such, when the Prime Minister and
President are directly involved in the creation of the commitment, that fact
has a major impact on policy and the priority of policy implementation on
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the home front. Moreover, when the head of state or government attaches a
high degree of personal importance and commitment to certain issues~ the
degree of implementation is even higher.
This political control variable also takes into account the leader's
individual personality and the importance he/she places on intemational
institutions and agreements, including those of the G7/G8 more generally.
For example, if a head of state or govemment demonstrates an attachment
to sustainable development initiatives, consistently advances these themes at
the annual' summits and demonstrates a commitment to multilateralism and
the G7/G8 process more specifically, compliance levels will tend to be higher.
Yet because G8 heads are not merely leaders, but democraticallyelected ones, their ability to impose their implementing will within their
government is constrained by their political standing within society at large.
When leaders and their parties enjoy high approval ratings and popularity,
their ability to implement is increased. In addition, when domestic public
opinion favors a particular issue - such as the environment in both Canada
and the U.S. - even unpopular leaders at the time, facing a likely electoral
defeat (such as Prime Minister Mulroney and President Bush) will comply
with their communiqué commitments. This is primarily because leaders recognize the effects of public opinion and political pressure in areas important
to their electorate.

Improving Compliance and the Quality of Commitments
In order for the G7/G8 summits to provide an environment for effective policymaking, they must establish a credible record, or the expectations placed
upon them and the attention paid to them will surely fade. The recommendations provided below are primarily based upon an analysis ofthe evidence
cited above, supplemented by material drawn from the general scholarly literature on compliance, monitoring and enforcement. Six proposals for
summit reform to enhance compliance and credibility are offered.
First, following British Prime Minister John Major's suggestions for
a more streamlined summit in 1992, the summit agenda should become less
overloaded, and reflect a more intense focus on only those issues where the
G7 /8 can make a notable difference. With the mass of intractable problems
that has inundated the annual summit agenda, leaders are less able to reach
cooperative agreements and understandings on policy matters, Jet alone
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attempt to implement concrete strategies to alleviate the problems in the first
instance. If leaders continue to attempt to resolve the myriad of issues they
are confronted with every year and fail, they risk damaging their reputations
and discrediting the summit process.
Second, leaders should internationalize domestic policy issues only
when, in the words of Putnam (1989) and Paarlberg (1997) a "positive synergistic linkage" can be developed. The solution is to remove from the agenda domestic issues that are not yet "ripe" as their internationalization may
led to negative synergistic linkages, delaying domestic actions and reform .
Third, summit leaders should focus on policy initiatives whose
means-ends relationships are well understood and accepted. Leaders should
articulate the means-ends relationships so asto establish their credibility and
thus maximize their effects on prívate agents.
Fourth, the G7/G8 should advance commitments in areas where
individual leaders and the collective heads of state and government hold
"formal" and real "authority". As explained by Aghion and Ti role ( 1997),
formal authority is the right to decide whereas real authority is effective control over decisions. For example, issues of monetary policy have never
been, for all practica! purposes, on the summit agenda. lt was readily understood that most ofthe leaders had neither the right to decide monetary objectives nor did they exercise control over monetary policy decisions. Loss of
fast-track authority by the U.S. President would then imply that trade should
not be part ofthe summit agenda. Likewise, commitments to be fulfilled by
supranational organizations should occur where the G7/G8 has a high
degree of real authority, such as the IMF, as opposed to organizations in
which the G7 does not possess disproportional voting rights, such as the
World Trade Organization (WTO ).
Fifth, related to issues of real and formal authority and principalagent problems is the credibility of the underlying institutional body that
will develop, implement, and carry out policy. Policy dialogue at the summit level should embrace only those areas where adequate domestic institutional bodies exist to develop and implement domestic policies.
Commitments made by principals whose agents are ill-equipped to carry out
the commitment can jeopardize the credibility and effectiveness ofthe policy announcement. In addition, the responsible institutional body should be
identified out so that the principal-agent relationship is understood.
Sixth, the 1998 Birmingham summit adopted a format similar to
that initially envisaged for the first G7 summit, whereby the leaders meet
completely separately from foreign and finance ministers. The importance
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of leaders meeting on their own during the summit should not be overstated, however. Compliance with summit commitments is more likely to come
with ministers on site during the three-day event. This is for three important
reasons. First, on-site finance and foreign ministers will generally have a
clearer understanding of the context and more specific aspects of the economic and political commitments and will thus be able to suggest appropriate implementation, monitoring and enforcement strategies. Second, with
ministers present on site, leaders can immediately instruct them to contribute resources from their respective ministries at the earliest possible
stage in the implementation process. Third, ministers can advise heads of
state and government immediately of unrealistic commitments and thus prevent them from making commitments that cannot be kept. Thus, in order for
compliance with summit commitments to be a realistic objective for the
G7/G8 members, it is essential that they return to their previous format of
having key ministers on site during the summit itself.
These six suggestions for reform provide a guide asto what issues
should be on the summit agenda by explicitly pointing toa more streamlined
and focused agenda as well as a more coherent and directed communiqué.
The final declarations should result in fewer commitments of higher quality
and greater credibility. In this regard, commitments are more Iikely to be
fulfilled when their impact on prívate agents and ultimate welfare targets are
maximized.

Conclusion

lt is undeniable that when heads of state and government get together, there
is no such thing as "just talk". However, when the summit agenda is filled
with idle time and cocktail parties, as the summits have increasingly done,
little can be expected. Yet the expectations and attention placed on the summits is high and continues to grow, as evidenced by the increasing number
of media credentials issued each year.
Compliance studies indicate that the summits do accomplish something, but perhaps notas muchas one would like them to. Reforms that Iead
to a streamlined and simpler summit format and that narrow the issues discussed to those that meet the criteria suggested above should generate fewer,
yet higher quality commitments, which are more likely to be fulfilled.
Though what one expects the summit to accomplish may be narrowed, it is
more Iikely that the summits can accomplish something.
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Notes

2
3

4
5
6

7

Energy is one functional area that stands apart in the von Furstenberg and
Daniels studies, indicating that policymakers may be more successful at
microeconomic reforms rather than macroeconomic policies.
Interview with senior U.S. government official, Washington, D.C., March
12, 1997.
Interview with senior Canadian govemment official, Toronto, February 12,
1997. Note that whereas G7 finance ministers meet four times ayear to
specifically discuss G7-related matters, foreign ministers meet only once a
year, and only on the margins ofthe opening session ofthe United Nations
General Assembly.
Interview with senior U.S. government official, Washington, D.C., March
11, 1997.
Interview with Sir Nicho las Bayne, Surrey, England, February 1, 1997.
The Earth Summit is referred toas a "nested regime" because of the institutional developments that rapidly transpired vis-a-vis the Rio declarations
following the conclusion of the United Nations Conference on the
Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992. For example, the UN
Commission on Sustainable Development was established in the aftermath
of UNCED as the follow-up body for the Rio conventions. Moreover, permanent secretariats were established for both the Climate Change and
Biodiversity Conventions in Bonn and Montreal respectively, with each
possessing the institutional underpinnings of a more formal regime: fixed
headquarters, a permanent secretariat, budgetary allocations and the creation of binding and enforceable rules.
Interview with senior Canadian government official, Montreal, January
31,1997.

References
Aghion, P. and Tirole, J. (1997), "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations",
Journal of Political Economy, 105(1), pp. 1-29.
Bergsten, C.F., and Henning, C.R. (1996), Global Economic Leadership and the
Group of Seven, Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C.
Blackburn, K. and Christensen, M. (1989), "Monetary Policy and Policy
Credibility", Journal ofEconomic Literature, vol. 27, pp. 1-45.
Chayes, A. and Chayes, A.H. (forthcoming), The New Sovereignty: Compliance

with International Regulatory Agreements.
Daniels, J. (1993), The Meaning and Reliability ofEconomic Summit Undertakings :
1975-1989, Garland Press, New York.
Dobson, W. (1991),"Economic Policy Coordination: Requiero or Prologue?" Policy

G8 Summits and Compliance 91
Ana/yses in lnternationa/ Economics, vol. 30, Institute for International
Economics, Washington, D.C.
Hodges, M. (1994), "More Efficiency, Less Dignity: British Perspectives on the
Future Role and Working of the G7", The lnternationa/ Spectator, 29(2),
pp. 141-159.
Jacobson, H.K. and Weiss, E.B. (1995), "Strengthening Compliance with
International Environmental Accords: Preliminary Observations from a
Collaborative Project", Global Governance, vol.l, No. 2, May-August, pp.
119-148.
Kokotsis, E. (1998), National Comp/iance with G7 Environment and Deve/opment
Commitments, 1988-1995, Ph.D. Dissertation, University ofToronto.
Kokotsis, E., and Kirton, J.J. (1997), Nationa/ Compliance with Environmenta/
Regimes: The Case ofthe G7, 1988-1995, paper presented at the Annual
Convention of the International Studies Association, Toronto, Ontario,
March 18-22, 1997.
Mitchell, R.B. (1994), 1ntentional Oil Pol/ution at Sea: Environmental Policy and
Treaty Comp/iance, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Paarlberg, R. (1997), "Agricultura} Policy Reform and the Uruguay Round:
Synergistic Linkage in a Two-Level Game?" lnternational Organization,
51(3), pp. 413-44.
Putnam, R. (1989), "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level
Games", lnternational Organization, 42, pp. 427-460.
Putnam, R., and Bayne, N. (1987), Hanging Together: Cooperation and Conflict in
the Seven-Power Summits, 2nd Edition, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA.
Putnam, R. and Henning, C.R. (1989), "The Bonn Summit of 1978: A Case Study
in Coordination", in R.N. Cooper, B. Eichengreen, G. Holtham, R.D.
Putnam and C.R. Henning (eds.), Can Nations Agree? Brookings
lnstitution, Washington, D.C., pp. 12-140.
Smyser, W.R. (1993), "Goodbye, G7", The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 1,
pp. 15-28.
Von Furstenberg, G., and Daniels, J.P. (1991), "Policy Undertakings by the Seven
Summit Countries: Ascertaining the Degree of Compliance", CamegieRochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 35, pp. 267-308.
Von Furstenberg, G. and Daniels, J.P. (1992), Economic Summit Declarations, 19751989: Examining the Written Record of lnternational Cooperation,
Princeton Studies in Intemational Finance, Princeton University Press,
New Jersey.
Yoshitomi, M. (1995), "Main lssues of Macroeconomic Coordination: The Peso,
Dallar and Yen Problems", 35-59, in S. Ostry and G.R. Winham, (eds.) The
Halifax Summit: Issues on the Table, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies,
Dalhousie University, Halifax.

